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Abstract
This paper analyzes stabilization policy under predetermined exchange
rates in a cash-in-advance, staggered-prices model. Under full credibility,
a reduction in the rate of devaluation results in an immediate and permanent
reduction in the inflation rate, with no effect on output or consumption.
In contrast, a non-credible stabilization results in an initial expansion
of output, followed by a later recession. The inflation rate of home goods
remains above the rate of devaluation throughout the program, thus resulting
in a sustained real exchange rate appreciation.
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Summary
In high inflation countries, stabilization programs that have used
the nominal exchange rate as the nominal anchor have been typically
characterized by an initial expansion in economic activity followed by
a later recession. The initial expansion has occurred in spite of an
appreciating real exchange rate. The real exchange rate has appreciated
throughout the programs as a result of the slow convergence of the rate
of inflation to the rate of devaluation. Later on this real appreciation
gives rise to a slowdown of economic activity.
This paper develops an analytical model that accounts for the main
stylized facts associated with exchange-rate-based stabilization. Lack
of credibility--in the sense that the public does not believe that the
program will be continued in the future--plays a key role in the analysis.
The model also incorporates the assumptions of perfect capital mobility
and sticky prices.
Under ful1 credibility, a reduction In the rate of devaluation
results in an immediate and permanent reduction in the inflation rate
to its new, lower steady-state level, without output costs. In contrast,
a noncredible program results in an initial expansion in the nontraded
goods sector because the temporarily lower nominal interest rate induces
higher aggregate demand. As a result of the expansion, the inflation
rate of nontraded goods falls by less than the rate of devaluation--and
could even increase. Hence the real exchange rate appreciates throughout
the program, which eventually results In a recession.
I. Introduction
In the late 1970s, the Southern-Cone countries (Argentina, Chile,
and Uruguay) launched stabilization programs based on a preannounced path
for the exchange rate that exhibited a declining rate of devaluation
("tablitas"). 1/ Policymakers expected that a stabilization plan based
on the exchange rate as the nominal anchor would act directly on
inflationary expectations--which were viewed as a central determinant of
short-run inflation--thereby increasing the chances of lowering inflation
at no significant real costs.
Contrary to what had been anticipated, inflation responded only
gradually to the lower rate of devaluation. 2/ For instance, by December
1980, two years after the beginning of the program, the 12-month inflation
rate in Argentina was 88 percent, compared to a 12-month devaluation rate
of 23 percent. As a result, the real exchange rate appreciated
substantially throughout the programs. In spite of an appreciating real
exchange rate, consumption and output expanded at the beginning of the
programs. In Argentina, for instance, consumption grew by 12.3 percent
in 1979, the first year of the program, after falling by 1.9 percent in
1978. Later in the programs, consumption and output collapsed. The trade
balance deteriorated sharply throughout the programs. Explaining the
intriguing phenomena that characterized these programs turned out to be a
difficult and challenging task (see Rodriguez (1982) for one of the
earlier and better-known accounts).
The heterodox programs in Argentina, Brazil, and Israel in the mid-
1980s brought back to the forefront the same type of issues (see Kiguel
and Liviatan (1989)). The case of Israel (see Figure 4) was particularly
striking because it showed that, even when successful, exchange-rate-based
stabilization programs may give rise to sizable real dislocations. In
terms of reducing inflation, the Israeli plan of July 1985 has been a
success: the four-quarter rate of inflation has remained around 20 percent
through the end of 1990. However, the consumption cycle occurred anyway:
consumption grew by 14.2 percent in 1986 but fell by 1 percent in 1989.
Based on the study of twelve exchange-rate-based stabilization
programs, Kiguel and Liviatan (1990) argue that the experience of the
Southern-Cone countries and Israel is typical of exchange-rate-based
1/ Figures 1 through 3 illustrate the Southern-Cone "tablitas." (Bars
indicate the beginning and the end of the stabilization plans.) The
Southern-Cone "tablitas" have been analyzed by, among many others, Corbo
(1985), Fernandez (1985), and Hanson and de Melo (1985).
2/ In Uruguay, in fact, inflation increased at the beginning of the
program (see Figure 3).
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stabilizations. 1/ The response of the economy to such programs is an
initial consumption/output expansion and appreciation of the real exchange
rate, followed by a consumption/output contraction and depreciation of the
real exchange rate. This "business cycle" associated with exchange-rate -
based stabilization runs counter to conventional wisdom--according to
which stabilization is expected to be accompanied by an immediate
contraction--and has been a source of confusion and puzzlement for
economic theorists and policymakers alike.
As a general rule, stabilization programs are not fully credible at
the time they are being launched. This lack of credibility is a natural
consequence of high inflation, since the latter reflects either sheer
incompetence by policymakers or hard-to-resolve political tensions.
Evidence of this lack of credibility is provided by the protracted high
differential between domestic and international interest rates exhibited
by most stabilization programs. Therefore, a plausible conjecture is that
the puzzling "business cycle" associated with exchange-rate-based
stabilization programs may be due, in part, to the programs' lack of
credibility.
The central objective of this paper is to explore the role of
credibility for the dynamics of exchange-rate-based programs and, in
particular, to examine under what conditions lack of policy credibility
could account for the above-mentioned "business cycle." To sharpen the
focus of our discussion, we will define a stabilization program as the
announcement of a lower (and constant) rate of devaluation. "Lack of
credibility" will be identified with a situation in which the public
believes that the program will be maintained for a given period of time,
after which the rate of devaluation is expected to return to a higher (and
constant) level, contrary to the policymaker's announcement. 2/
1/ The term "chronic inflation," coined by Pazos (1972), refers to
inflationary processes that last many years and exhibit considerable
inertia. In contrast, as Pazos (1972) argues, hyperinflations usually
last short periods of time and are explosive processes. It should be
noted that, unlike the programs analyzed by Kiguel and Liviatan (1990),
the recent stabilization attempt in Poland, also a chronic-inflation
country (see Coricelli and de Rezende Rocha (1990)), has been accompanied
by an initial output contraction. Such a contraction may be explained by
supply-side considerations and/or tight credit policy (see Calvo and
Coricelli (1991) and the discussion in Section III regarding the use of
the money supply as an additional nominal anchor).
2/ We view this as the relevant exercise even for cases such as the
"tablitas" in which the exchange rate was not fixed at the beginning of
the program because, when the "tablitas" were later discontinued, the
devaluation rates that followed the abandonment of the programs were of
such a magnitude that the "slope" of the "tablitas" is relatively
insignificant.
Figure 1. Argentinean Tablita
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Figure 2. Chilean Tablita
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Figure 3. Uruguayan Tablita
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Figure 4. Israeli Stabilization
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This paper develops a cash-in-advance, staggered-prices model that
accounts for the following stylized facts: (i) when the program is
implemented, there is an increase in consumption of traded goods and, as
a result, a trade balance deficit; (ii) in the first stages of the
program, the non-traded-goods (or home-goods) sector is operating above
its full-employment level at the same time that the real exchange rate is
appreciating; (iii) the home-goods sector enters into recession (i.e.,
output falls below its full-employment level) either when or before the
program is expected to be discontinued; and (iv) the inflation rate of
home goods remains above the rate of devaluation until the time at which
the program is expected to be discontinued, thus resulting in a sustained
and cumulative real exchange rate appreciation. It is worth emphasizing
that price stickiness is not brought into the picture just to belabor a
tired Keynesian theme; rather, price stickiness is essential in generating
the results (ii) through (iv) mentioned above. The first result, which
depends only on the assumptions of cash-in-advance and perfect capital
mobility, is the one emphasized by Calvo (1986) in the context of a
flexible-prices model. 1/
Following Calvo (1983), sticky prices are modeled with a (forward-
looking) staggered-prices technology a la Phelps (1978)-Taylor (1979). It
satisfies a convenient (and somewhat remarkable) feature: if the economy
starts at steady state, a once-and-for-all credible reduction in the rate
of devaluation results in an immediate and permanent reduction in the
inflation rate to its new lower steady-state level, without either output
costs or changes in the consumption path. This is an interesting result
because it shows that the existence of sticky prices does not necessarily
generate a tradeoff between output and inflation. Analytically, the main
advantage of this sticky-prices model is that no "business cycle" asso-
ciated with exchange-rate-based stabilization arises if the stabilization
program is fully credible. This feature of the model will make it easier
to identify the effects of lack of credibility discussed in the paper.
The basic intuition behind the main results is as follows. The model
postulates a cash-in-advance constraint, according to which the demand for
money is a fixed proportion of consumption. Thus, the "effective" spot
price of consumption of traded goods is an increasing function of the
(instantaneous) nominal interest rate, since the latter is the user's cost
of liquidity held against consumption. Moreover, due to the assumption of
perfect international capital mobility, the nominal interest rate rises
and falls, point by point, with the expected rate of devaluation. There-
fore, an expected discontinuation of the stabilization program at time T
implies that the effective price of consumption is expected to be high in
the future (i.e., after time T) relative to the present (i.e., from the
start of the program to time T), which induces an increase in the
1/ See Vegh (1991) for an interpretation, in terms of the present
model, of stylized facts associated with exchange-rate-based
stabilization.
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consumption of traded goods between time 0 and time T. Since the relative
price of traded with respect to non-traded goods (i.e., the real exchange
rate) is a predetermined variable, the increase in consumption of traded
goods must be accompanied by an increase in consumption of home goods,
thus generating the initial output boom (output of home goods is demand-
determined). 1/ The rise in aggregate demand implies that the reduction
in the inflation rate of home goods falls short of the reduction in the
rate of devaluation--and could even increase. As a result, a prolonged
period of real exchange rate appreciation sets in as the rate of inflation
of home goods remains above the rate of devaluation until time T. Thus,
an overheated economy co-exists with an appreciating real exchange rate
for a prolonged period of time.
As the real exchange rate appreciates over time (i.e., as the
relative price of home goods increases over time), aggregate demand for
home goods falls, which in turn reduces output of home goods. This
implies that, if the credibility horizon, T, is large, output falls below
its full-employment level even before time T arrives, as a result of the
highly appreciated real exchange rate. The model can thus explain the
recession that has been observed in practice in successful programs or,
in failed programs, before the collapse occurred (see Kiguel and Liviatan
(1990)). 2/ At time T, a sharp (i.e., discrete) fall in output
accompanies the fall in consumption of traded goods at time T, due to
the same type of argument examined above. Hence, for small credibility
horizons, output falls below its full-employment level only at the time at
which the program is expected to collapse.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II introduces the model and
analyzes a non-credible reduction in the devaluation rate. Section III
discusses extensions of the model (specifically, the use of the money
supply as an additional anchor and the effects of backward indexation),
and then concludes.
II. The Model
Consider a small open economy inhabited by a large number of
identical individuals. The lifetime utility of the representative
individual is given by:
1/ The real exchange rate is a predetermined variable because, first,
the stabilization plan involves a lowering of the rate of devaluation,
initially keeping unchanged the level of the exchange rate (which
determines the domestic price of tradables), and, second, the price of
home goods is, by the staggered-prices technology, also a predetermined
variable.
2/ Naturally, we are implicitly assuming that the actual collapse took
place when it was expected to occur.
- 5 -
(1) J (u(ct) + v(c£)]exp<-0t)dt,
0
where c and c denote consumption of traded and non-traded (or home)
goods, respectively; and f$ is the subjective discount rate. To simplify
the exposition, the instantaneous utility function is assumed to be
separable. 1/
Consumers can hold two assets: domestic non-interest-bearing money
and an internationally-traded bond, which yields a constant return in
terms of traded goods equal to r. 2/ Financial wealth in terms of traded
goods is denoted by a and is given by
(2) at = mt + bt,
where m and b stand for real monetary balances and the stock of real
bonds in the hands of the public, respectively. The overall budget
constraint for the representative individual is
00 00
(3) a0 + J (yt/et + y* + rt)exp(-rt)dt - J (ct/et + c* + itmt)exp(-rt)dt
0 0
where y* and y denote output of traded and non-traded goods, respectively;
e stands for the relative price of traded in terms of home goods (i.e.,
the real exchange rate); r denotes government lump-sum transfers in terms
of traded goods; and i stands for the instantaneous nominal interest rate
in terms of domestic currency. Equation (3) represents the familiar
budget constraint whereby the consumer's lifetime expenditure equals the
present discounted value of his income. At each point in time t, his
1/ The functions u(c*) and v(c*) are assumed to be twice-continuously
differentiable, increasing, and strictly concave. Our main results would
still hold for non-separable instantaneous utility functions provided that
c and c are normal goods.
2/ Throughout the paper, and except for the real exchange rate (see
below), the term "real" refers to nominal variables deflated by the price
of traded goods.
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expenditure is given by the cost of consumption, ct/et + c*t, plus the
rental cost of money holdings, itmt.
The consumer is required to hold domestic money to carry out his
consumption purchases. More specifically, he is subject to a cash-in-
advance constraint
a(ct/et + ct) < mt, a > 0,
under which minimum real monetary balances are directly proportional to
the value of consumption expenditures. 1/ Notice that if the nominal
interest rate, i, is positive, the rational consumer will hold the minimum
required monetary balances which, according to equation (4), are given by
a(ct/et + c t). Since the analysis will concentrate on situations in which
i. is positive, the budget constraint (3) can be rewritten as
(5) a0 (yt/et rt)exp(-rt)dt = / (ct/et + c*)(l + ait)exp-(rt)dt
0
The consumer's optimization problem is to maximize his utility
function, (1), with respect to the path of c and c*, subject to his
initial financial wealth, a0, and his intertemporal budget constraint,
(5). The first-order conditions for this optimization problem are: 2/
(6) v'(ct*) = ai t),
(7) v'(c*)/u'(ct) - et,
where A is the (time - invariant) Lagrange multiplier associated with
constraint (5), and, as usual, can be interpreted as the marginal utility
of wealth. Equation (6) is the familiar condition whereby, at the
1/ See Feenstra (1985) for the derivation of the cash-in-advance
constraint in continuous time.
2/ In what follows, it will be assumed that r = ft. This assumption is
made in order to highlight the dynamics of temporary policy in an
otherwise essentially stationary environment.
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optimum, the marginal utility of consumption of traded goods equals the
marginal utility of wealth times the effective price of traded goods. The
effective price of traded goods is the sum of the market price (equal to
unity) and the opportunity cost of the monetary balances held per unit of
traded goods consumed, ait. Finally, condition (7) equates the marginal
rate of substitution between traded and home goods to their relative
price, e.
The other main actor in this economy is the government. The
government's budget constraint indicates that the present discounted value
of (lump-sum) transfers, r, equals the government's initial holdings of
bonds, h0, plus the present discounted value of the proceeds from money
creation. Formally,
(8) J rtexp(-rt)dt = ho + / (mt + ctmt)exp(-rt)dt,
0 0
where c is the instantaneous rate of devaluation (i.e., c = E/E, where E
denotes the nominal exchange rate, defined as units of domestic currency
per unit of foreign currency). The terms mt + £tmt represent the proceeds
from money creation.
Equilibrium in the home-goods sector requires:
(9) ct = yt.
Moreover, perfect capital mobility is assumed, which implies that:
(10) it = r + ct
Combining equations (3), (8), (9) and (10) yields the budget
constraint for the economy as a whole
00 00
(11) k0 + J y*exp(-rt)dt = J c£exp(-rt)dt,
0 0
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where k = b + h is net national wealth. Thus, equation (11) states that
the economy's wealth in terms of traded goods equals the present
discounted value of traded goods consumed.
We now turn to the supply side of the model. For simplicity of
exposition, it will be assumed that the supply of traded goods is
exogenously given and constant, while the home-goods sector operates under
staggered price-setting and supply is demand-determined. 1/ Following the
staggered-prices model in Calvo (1983), we postulate:
(12) nt = -0Dt, $ > 0,
where n is the inflation rate of home goods, and D = y - y, where y may
be interpreted as "full employment" output, is a measure of excess demand
in the home-goods market. Equation (12) can be derived from a set-up in
which firms set prices in an asynchronous manner, taking into account the
expected future path of both the average price of home goods and the path
of excess demand in that market. Equation (12) indicates that the rate of
change in the inflation rate is a negative function of excess demand.
Intuitively, the higher is excess demand at time t, the higher will be the
prices set by those firms that revise their prices at time t. Therefore,
the higher is excess demand at time t, the higher will be the rate of
inflation at t, rt. Furthermore, excess demand at time t is not taken
into account by price setters at t', for all t' > t. Hence, the higher is
excess demand at time t, the sharper will be the drop in the inflation
rate after t, which is what equation (12) asserts. 2/
By equation (7), there exists an implicit functional relationship
between the consumption of home goods, c, traded goods, c*, and the real
exchange rate. Formally, 3/
(13) ct =
1/ A more symmetric, but less tractable, treatment of the two sectors
obtains if it is assumed that, first, output in each of the two sectors is
a neoclassical function of labor; second, prices are perfectly flexible;
and, third, wages are staggered. As discussed in Calvo and Vegh (1991),
the basic results remain unchanged.
2/ The microfoundations of the staggered-prices model are discussed in
Calvo (1982) and Romer (1989).
3/ Signs under the arguments of a function denote the signs of the
corresponding partial derivatives.
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The signs of the partial derivatives follow from standard comparative
statics, recalling that functions u(c) and v(c*) are assumed to be
increasing and strictly concave.
Substituting equation (13) into equation (12), and using (9)
(recalling that D = y - y) yields
By definition, e = EP*/P, where P* is the foreign currency price of
the traded good, and P is the average price of non-traded goods. Thus
(assuming, for simplicity, that P* is constant),
(15) et - (c -
where c denotes the constant rate of devaluation.
Equations (14) and (15) constitute the basic dynamic system implied
by the model. We are now in the position to address the central issues of
the paper. In the first place, consider the impact of a once-and-for-all
change in the rate of devaluation, c. This experiment corresponds to the
case in which the announcement by the authorities of a permanent change in
the rate of devaluation is fully credible. Because of perfect capital
mobility (equation (10)), the nominal interest rate changes to a new (but
still constant over time) level. Hence, by equations (6) and (10), it
follows that consumption of traded goods is constant over time. Thus,
by equation (11), c is equal to its permanent-income level (i.e.,
c*t = y* + rk0, for all t) and is independent of the rate of
devaluation. 1/ Consequently, c is invariant to permanent changes in the
rate of devaluation. We now turn to examine the behavior of the other
variables in the model.
Figure 5 depicts system (14)-(15) for a time - invariant path of c*
(i.e., c*t=0). It can be verified that the system exhibits saddle-path
stability. Hence, under perfect foresight--and for a given set of
parameters--all converging and continuous equilibrium paths (the only ones
1/ For simplicity, it will be assumed that y*t is constant over time
(i.e., yt = y* for all t.)
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considered in the present paper) must lie on the saddle path A'A'. 1/ The
real exchange rate, e, is a predetermined variable (i.e., it does not
jump), while the rate of inflation, TT, is free to jump. Therefore, given
the real exchange rate, the inflation rate will adjust so as to position
the system on the saddle path A'A', which implies that the equilibrium
path is unique.
For the sake of concreteness, let us now assume that the system is
initially at steady state A, where the rate of inflation of home goods
equals that of traded goods and is equal, in turn, to the rate of
devaluation e . 2/ Moreover, by equation (14), at steady state we have
V * <£(ess,css). Thus, since, as shown above, c is not affected by
permanent changes in c, the steady-state real exchange rate is the same
for all constant rates of devaluation, e. Suppose then that the rate of
devaluation is reduced to c . By equation (15), this implies that,
starting at steady state, if the inflation rate, TT, changes in exactly the
same magnitude as the rate of devaluation, then the system will move
immediately to the new steady state. Since, as argued above, equilibrium
solutions are unique, it follows that a permanent change in the rate of
devaluation results in an equal change in the rate of inflation of home
goods, while the real exchange rate does not move. In terms of Figure 5,
the system will move from point A to point B. Consequently, by
equation (13), consumption of home goods is not affected by a permanent
change in the rate of devaluation. 3/
The experiment shows that, by announcing a permanently lower rate of
devaluation which is fully credible, inflation could be immediately
lowered, without provoking any change in real variables, despite the
presence of staggered prices. This is due, in part, to the fact that our
price-setting mechanism is essentially forward-looking.
We now turn to examine the implications of transitory stabilization
experiments. In this connection, the central insights can be obtained by
focusing on the simple case in which the rate of devaluation is
temporarily set at a lower (constant) level, and is later raised back to
its original level. As will be argued below, this experiment yields the
same outcome that would obtain in the following case of lack of
credibility: the policymaker announces a permanent reduction in the rate
1/ As shown in Calvo (1983), the path of the inflation rate must be
continuous along an equilibrium solution. Hence, since the real exchange
rate, e, is necessarily continuous, equilibrium paths in the (r,e) plane
are continuous, as assumed here. Moreover, the convergence condition
could be justified following the lines suggested by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983;
2/ Steady-state values will be denoted by the subscript "ss";
superscripts "h" and "1" denote "high" and "low" values of a given
variable, respectively.
3/ Indeed, proceeding as in Calvo and Vegh (1990b), one can show that
"superneutrality" of permanent changes in c also holds when the system
starts outside the steady-state equilibrium.
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Figure 5
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of devaluation, but the public believes that the rate of devaluation will
go back to its initial level after a certain period of time. Formally,
we take t « 0 as the "present". The initial steady state (i.e., before
t = 0) corresponds to a rate of devaluation e = £ . At t=0, the
authorities announce the following policy:
(16a) ct = £*, for 0 < t < T,
(16b) ct = £h, for t > T\
where T > 0, and c^ < £h.
By the assumption of perfect capital mobility (10), policy (16)
implies that during the interval [0,T)--hereafter referred to as the
"transition"--the domestic nominal interest rate, i, is lower than after
T. This implies, by first-order condition (6), that consumption of
traded goods during the transition is higher than after T. 1/ More
specifically, one can show that there are consumption levels c*h and c*h
(where c*h > c*l) such that
(17a) c* = c*h, for 0 < t < T,
(17b) cl = c*xt for t > T.
This result is quite intuitive. As noted before, the effective price
of traded goods includes both their market price and the opportunity cost
of the associated money holdings. Therefore, the effective price of
traded goods is relatively low during the transition, and thus induces a
correspondingly higher consumption.
The overall budget constraint (11) implies that during the transition
consumption of traded goods is larger than initial permanent income (i.e.,
c*h > y* +rk0) , while consumption of traded goods falls below initial
permanent income after time T (i.e., c*l < y* +rk0). Panel A in Figure 6
illustrates the time path of consumption of traded goods. The resulting
time path of the current account—which is illustrated in Panel B in
Figure 6--follows from the flow constraint of the economy as whole, given
bv
1/ Note that the multiplier A adjusts instantaneously to its new
steady-state value at t = 0. Therefore, the increase in i at time T
implies that consumption of traded goods falls at that time.
- 12 -
(18) kt = y* + rkt - c*t.
On impact, the current account jumps into deficit as a result of the
increase in consumption of traded goods, which causes the trade balance to
deteriorate. Although the trade balance remains constant during the
transition, the current account deficit widens over time, as net interest
income on foreign assets decreases, and jumps back into balance at time T.
As Figures (l)-(4) illustrate, a deterioration of the trade balance
characterized both the Southern-Cone "tablitas" and the Israeli plan.
Figure 7 can be used to derive the dynamic path of inflation of non-
traded goods and the real exchange rate. The initial steady state is at
point A where TTSS = c*1 and ess= v' (y +rko)/u'(y). (The latter equation
follows from equation (7), (9), and the fact that, at the initial steady
state, CgS - y +rk0.) At the new steady state, given by point C in
Figure 7, inflation remains unchanged but the real exchange rate is higher
(i.e., e s s = v'(c*^)/u*(y)), because consumption of traded goods is lower.
Thus, the dynamic system must hit C'C'--the saddle path corresponding to
steady-state C--at t = T. During the transition, the dynamic system is
governed by the laws of motion drawn in Figure 7, which correspond to
point D. Point D represents the stationary point of the dynamic system
during the transition (where e - v'(c*^)/u'(y) and n - ch) and D'D'
denotes the corresponding saddle path. Therefore, on impact (i.e., at
t - 0)--and assuming that T is relatively large--the system jumps to a
point like G, proceeds along an unstable path to hit point H at t = T, and
then travels along the saddle path C'C' towards point C. 1/
The time paths of the inflation rate of home goods and the real
exchange rate are illustrated in Panels C and D, respectively, in
1/ The system cannot jump to point K or to the left of point K because,
if it did, it would not hit C'C' at time T (recall that the inflation rate
cannot jump at time T). The path AGHC illustrated in Figure 7 assumes a
relative large value of the credibility horizon, T. For small values of
T, the rise in consumption of traded goods at time 0 is relatively large
(the proof would proceed along the lines of Calvo and Vegh (1990a)), which
implies that inflation always falls during the transition, as illustrated
by the path AEFC in Figure 7. (For graphical simplicity, Figure 7
abstracts from the fact that the shifts in the n = 0 schedule depend on he
magnitude of T.)
It can also be shown that the inflation rate of home goods can
actually go up on impact (path AIJC in Figure 7). For this to happen, the
reduction in the rate of devaluation must be large enough and the
credibility horizon, T, must be small. Both features ensure that the
expansionary effect of the stabilization plan on the consumption of traded
goods is large. In such a case, the positive effect on the initial jump
of the inflation rate resulting from the increase in consumption of traded
goods is large enough so as to offset the negative effect on the inflation
rate of the lower rate of devaluation.
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Figure 7
Dynamics in the (TT,e) Plane
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Figure 6. As illustrated in Figures (1) through (4), the appreciation of
the real (effective) exchange rate is particularly marked in the Southern-
Cone "tablitas" (with an occasional interruption in the trend in Chile due
to nominal exchange rate adjustments). 1/ In the Israeli case, the
pattern is less pronounced at the beginning of the program due to the
depreciation of the dollar in international exchange markets. Figures (1)
through (4) also show the "stickiness" of the inflation rate which, in the
context of this model, is due to lack of credibility. 2/ The notable
exception is Israel, where the inflation rate fell sharply at the very
beginning of the program and remained at around 20 percent a year ever
since. In the Southern-Cone "tablitas," where erratic quarter-to-quarter
changes make it more illuminating to look at the trend, inflation fell
only very slowly, particularly in the case of Argentina. In Uruguay, in
fact, inflation increased at the beginning of the program, a possibility
that is consistent with the model, as discussed above.
Consider now the time path of consumption of home goods.
Differentiating equation (7), and recalling that consumption of traded
goods is time-invariant, yields
(19) u"(ct)ct/u'(ct) = -et/et,
which implies that consumption of home goods moves in the same direction
as the real exchange rate does. Figure 6, Panel E, illustrates the time
path of consumption of home goods. The fall in the rate of devaluation
causes the nominal interest to fall and consumption of traded goods to
increase on impact. Since the relative price of traded goods in terms of
home goods (i.e., the real exchange rate) is given at time 0, consumers
do not want to alter the consumption of home goods relative to consumption
of traded goods. Therefore, the rise in the consumption of traded goods
must be accompanied by a rise in consumption of home goods (see
equation (7)). Over time, the appreciation of the real exchange rate,
which renders home goods more expensive relative to traded goods, leads to
a declining consumption path of home goods. For large T, c falls below
its full-employment level before time T arrives, as illustrated in
Figure 6, Panel E. 3/ At time T, the downward jump in consumption of
1/ Note that the real exchange rate illustrated in Figures (l)-(4),
which is an effective exchange rate, does not correspond exactly to the
definition used in the model. However, other definitions of the real
exchange rate followed the same pattern.
2/ In the model, the inflation rate depicted in Figures (1) through (4)
corresponds to an average of the inflation rate of traded goods, e, and
the Inflation rate of home goods, TT.
3/ For small values of T, consumption of home goods is above y for all
t < T.
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traded goods must be accompanied by an downward jump in consumption of
non-traded goods. The high growth of consumption in the first stages of
the programs shows very clearly in Figures (1) through (4). In some cases
(Argentina and Uruguay), consumption growth began to slow down before the
plans ended. In the Israeli case, consumption growth has turned negative
in spite of the success of the plan.
The time path of the domestic real interest rate, rd, is illustrated
in Figure 6, Panel F (for a large T). The time path can be derived by
noting that, by definition, rd = i - n. On impact, rd falls because
inflation of home goods declines by less, if at all, than the rate of
devaluation. At time T, the rise in i implies that rd jumps upwards.
During the transition, rd remains below its initial value. 1/ The
behavior, at the beginning of the program, of real interest rates in the
Southern-Cone "tablitas" appears consistent with the predictions of the
model. As illustrated in Figures (1) through (3), real (deposit) interest
rates were relatively low at the beginning of the programs and increased
afterwards. In fact, the conventional wisdom at the time (see Fernandez
(1985), Corbo (1985), and Hanson and de Melo (1985)) was that the fall in
real interest rates at the beginning of the program caused the initial
boom, as Rodriguez's (1982) model predicts. Towards the end of the
programs, however, real interest rates reached very high levels, a feature
that the present model does not capture most likely because of the lack of
uncertainty regarding the end of the program (see Section III) . In the
case of Israel, real interest rates increased sharply upon implementation
of the program, as illustrated in Figure 4. As discussed in Section III,
these high real interest rates can be explained analytically if money is
taken to be an additional anchor, which is consistent with the Israeli
case (see Barkai (1990)).
Suppose now that the policymaker actually announces that the rate of
devaluation c will be permanently maintained at the lower level £ , but
the public, disbelieving the policy announcement, expects that c will go
back to its higher level c" after a certain time T. Clearly, during the
transition all the equilibrium variables will behave exactly as they do
under a temporary experiment like the one just analyzed. This shows that
a policy intended to lower inflation with minimal real effects may fail
to achieve its objective as a result of not enjoying full credibility on
the part of the public.
1/ For a small T, rd always increases during the transition.
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III. Final Remarks
This final section discusses the use of money as an additional
nominal anchor, the effects of backward indexation (or inflation inertia),
and then offers some concluding remarks.
1. Money as an additional nominal anchor
The analysis has shown that a policy intended to lower inflation
with minimal real effects may fail to achieve its objective as a result of
not enjoying full credibility. Thus, the question arises as to whether
using money as an additional anchor may help to insulate economic
variables from the effects of imperfect credibility. For instance, the
Israeli 1985 plan had an explicit target for bank credit, which was to be
achieved by a combination of higher reserve requirements and a higher
discount rate (see, for instance, Barkai (1990)). The idea behind having
some monetary anchor is to offset the inflationary consequences of a
potentially huge increase in the supply of money during the first stages
of the program. High reserve requirements, by forcing the banks to pay
less on interest-bearing money, decrease the demand for money. A high
discount rate tends to reduce the supply of money by making it more
difficult for banks to get access to reserve money. In Calvo and Vegh
(1991), we capture the idea of using money as an additional anchor by
assuming that the stock of money is predetermined at each point in time
due to the presence of capital controls. We find that using money as an
additional anchor may be effective in curtailing the initial consumption
boom precisely because of the resulting liquidity "crunch." However, we
show that the initial appreciation of the real exchange rate may not be
avoided (although it could perhaps be lessened). Furthermore, lack of
credibility may still be costly because it may generate an initial
recession. We also show that the real interest rate in terms of traded
goods--which, naturally, remains constant under perfect capital mobility--
rises at the beginning of the program. The domestic real interest rate is
also above its initial value in the last phase of the transition. This
result is in accordance with the general belief (see, for instance, Barkai
(1990)) that the highly restrictive monetary policy at the beginning of
the Israeli stabilization was responsible for the large increase in real
interest rates (see Figure 4).
2. Backward indexation
An important issue that arises regarding stabilization programs is
the possibility of inflation "inertia." As shown above, inflation
inertia is not a necessary consequence of the existence of staggered
price-setting. This is partly due to the fact that price setters are
assumed to be forward-looking. Several authors have argued, however, that
in some high-inflation countries (e.g., Chile during the 1970's and
Brazil) wage contracts are characterized by backward-looking, price-
indexation clauses. 1/ This type of indexation is high in the list of
1/ See, for example, Dornbusch and Simonsen (1987) and Edwards (1990).
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suspects for explaining slow inflation convergence to its target value
(see Dornbusch and Simonsen (1987)). To analyze its effect in the present
model, Calvo and Vegh (1991) assume full credibility and modify the
price-setting mechanism of the model to accommodate backward price
indexation. Interestingly, while the model exhibits an initial
appreciation of the real exchange rate, the initial stages of the program
show a contraction of consumption and output. This suggests that, in the
presence of optimizing consumers and full credibility, backward indexation
may not be capable of accounting for the simultaneous occurrence of an
expansion in the home-goods sector and real exchange rate appreciation. 1/
3. Conclusions
This paper has illustrated the vulnerability of stabilization
programs with respect to beliefs of the private sector about the economic
and/or political sustainability of such programs. The examples are
particularly worrisome because vulnerability of stabilization programs is
displayed even though there is no inertia or confusion on the part of the
public about the relevant model and its associated parameters. Thus, to
avoid the credibility-related transitional dynamics, policymakers should
be able to convince the public that the program will be carried out as
announced. This is not an easy task because modifications of the
announced program do, by necessity, occur in the future. Therefore, in
principle, there is no way for the policymaker to categorically prove to
the public that the policy announcement will be honored until the economy
actually arrives at the point in time at which the public expects the
policy to change its course. Hence, in practice, a stabilization program
is likely to suffer from credibility problems during some initial period
of time and, consequently, to be buffeted, even to the point of sinking
the ship, by the occasionally strong and persistent lack-of-credibility
winds.
The paper also illustrates how misleading it may be to conduct policy
under the assumption that credibility can be taken for granted (and that
backward indexation would automatically vanish when faced with the
"blinding light" of exchange-rate-based programs). Under full credibility
and sudden deindexation, the mere announcement of a fixed exchange rate
would stop inflation on its track. There may be no need to sterilize
capital inflows or to interfere with the economy in any form or manner.
Thus, a fixed exchange rate regime could bring, in a short span of time,
if not immediately, all the benefits of Germany's price stability to any
country that pegs its currency to the DM. Unfortunately, one is at a
serious loss in finding actual examples of such costless stabilization
episodes, particularly in the post-modern world of high capital mobility.
1/ Where there is lack of credibility, the presence of backward
indexation does not change the basic results obtained in Section II.
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The realization that a "quick-fix" stabilization policy is unlikely
to be an option brings to the fore issues like credibility and backward
indexation. Backward indexation is relatively easy to deal with by, for
instance, outlawing wage contracts exhibiting such characteristics.
Credibility, on the other hand, is enormously more subtle and complicated.
The paper suggests that if credibility is a problem, there are no costless
solutions. However, the discussion also suggests that policy could
actually have an impact on cushioning and even changing the direction of
certain variables over time. Thus, a policy package will have to involve
measures other than mere fixing (or predetermining) the exchange rate to
steer the system closer to the optimum. In this respect, using the money
supply as an additional anchor may help to stabilize consumption because a
predetermined money supply may have severe dampening effects on
consumption.
Our results rely on the consumption effects of temporarily lower
nominal interest rates. We believe that such a channel is empirically
important in high inflation countries in which nominal interest rates are
substantially lower at the beginning of the plan than after the plan is
abandoned. In Uruguay, for instance, loan rates reached a low of
62 percent per annum in the third quarter of the program compared to
105.5 percent per annum in the first quarter after the plan was abandoned.
In addition to the intertemporal channel discussed in this paper, lower
nominal interest rates can also result in higher consumption if consumers
face financial liquidity constraints whereby cash is needed to meet
interest payments (see Calvo and Vegh (1991)). Such liquidity constraints
affect consumption both by further reducing the effective price of
consumption and by lowering the real interest rate relevant for
consumption decisions.
In the present model, interest rates do not exhibit risk premia
because the public knows with certainty when the program will be
abandoned. Risk premia could be incorporated into the model by assuming,
first, that the public is uncertain as to when the program will end (as
in Helpman and Drazen (1988), and, second, that there will be a one-step
adjustment in the nominal exchange rate when the program is abandoned.
We conjecture that our previous results will still hold under these
conditions.
Finally, it may be instructive to endogenize credibility. This is a
major task in itself. We conjecture that reasonable extensions of the
present model that allow for endogenous credibility will not substantially
change the implications obtained in this paper for the early stages of the
program, particularly if history matters (i.e., if people's priors depend
on past government behavior, and their priors change slowly over time).
However, we think that endogenizing credibility is likely to shed
important light on policy issues. For example, endogenous credibility
would make it possible to find conditions under which controls on capital
mobility are a useful device to smooth out the "business cycle" associated
with exchange-rate-based stabilization (for an early effort in this
direction, see Persson and van Wjinbergen (1988)). Specifically, one
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would like to answer questions such as: How is credibility affected by
policy? Will it be enhanced, or, perhaps reduced even more because
interventionist governments reveal a preference for time inconsistency?
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